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Disjunctivism is a view in the philosophy of perception that has recently gained much attention. On this view, there is no genuine mental kind of perceptual experience, defined by its particular phenomenal character, that veridical perception and hallucination have in common. So for instance, seeing a red apple may well be introspectively indistinguishable from hallucinating a red apple; still, the disjunctivist claims that the seeing and the hallucinating are fundamentally different mental states. One motivation for this view is the plausibility of naive realism, which claims that our perceptions are partly constituted by the worldly objects that they are confrontations with, and which appears to force us to adopt disjunctivism.
In class, we will try to get clear on the claims and consequences of this view and related views. We will also examine the competition, in particular intentionalism. We will use the anthologies Disjunctivism: Contemporary Readings and Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. The language of the seminar is English.
Literatur:
Alex Byrne und Heather Logue (Hg.). Disjunctivism: Contemporary Readings. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 2009.
Adrian Haddock und Fiona Macpherson (Hg.). Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2008. |
